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Racing against Time? Aspects of the Temporal 
Organization of the Runner’s World
Greg Smith
University of Salford
Drawing on documentary sources and participant observation, I seek to
specify salient temporal characteristics of the social world of running.
Extant analyses seem preoccupied with criticizing running temporality for
reproducing, in a sporting context, those Taylorized, alienating beliefs and
oppressive practices typical of capitalist sites of production. A different
point of departure, runners’ own understandings, shows that temporal con-
siderations are a key constituent of the runner’s self that is not experienced
as alienated. Three aspects of running temporality are highlighted: the
large-scale temporal organization of the running world, with a focus on the
cyclical racing pattern and the planned and scheduled character of train-
ing; temporal features of running careers; and the way in which “times”
gure in the activity of running and its description. I conclude that these
temporal organizations are important symbolic resources that help to build
and reafrm the runner’s self. Rather than time alienating and exploiting
runners, runners exploit it as a constructive resource that they can deploy
in diverse ways.
The temporal dimension is a conspicuous feature of the talk and activity of runners
at every level of ability and involvement. Close students of running and runners
themselves take a keen interest in the “lap times,” “personal bests,” and “records”
set for a multitude of combinations of gender and age grading, place, and event.
Temporal indications are also prominent in speech about activities related to the
enactment of running. One often hears talk of “nding the time” for training, of
“training schedules,” of “good days,” of “weeks missed” (because of illness, injury,
etc.), of “next year’s aims,” of “recovery periods,” of “weekly mileages,” and so on.
Time, that omnipresent characteristic of social life, has special signicance in the
running world. Runners learn to attend to time as nely tuned markers of running
achievement, as careers with stages and turning points, and as cyclical calendars.
This article addresses selected aspects of the signicance of time in running
through a qualitative study of published accounts given by runners1 about their ac-
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tivities. These accounts appeared in a leading British magazine about athletics; I sup-
plemented my analysis with data from participant observation. Most of the material
presented here necessarily deals with the reported experiences of elite runners. My
primary interest in this material is interpretive, that is, directed toward the sociologi-
cal elucidation of participants’ understandings of common temporal patterns.
METHODS AND DATA
The published accounts derive from two main sources: (1) approximately fty inter-
views with accomplished runners published over a four-year period in a popular
British athletics magazine; (2) forty replies to a standard questionnaire distributed
by the same magazine and published as an occasional column, “Who’s Who in Brit-
ish Athletics.” For convenience, I refer to these two sources of data as “interview
proles” and “questionnaire proles” respectively. I have also used selected ex-
cerpts from newspaper and other magazine reports and kindred biographical sources.
These documentary sources of data are supplemented and contextualized by eld
notes from several decades of my own participation in and observation of running.
Although the participant observational data added to the documentary data and
provided new information, I maintained a reexive relationship between both data
sources. Inspection of the documentary sources has helped to make my taken-for-
granted understandings of the running world more explicit. At the same time, my
direct knowledge of running and runners’ typical experiences aided the interpreta-
tion of the documentary materials.
Both the interview proles and the questionnaire proles invite the runner to
reect on his or her experiences, but the former does so in a more unstructured way.
The interviewer is a staff journalist who specializes in covering running events. We
cannot regard published interviews as literal representations of the interviewer-
subject encounter—some “working up” of questions and replies probably occurs in
the majority if not all of the cases—but this need not invalidate the material for so-
ciological purposes. Unlike the interviews, the list of questions put to the subjects of
the questionnaire proles was not published but can be inferred2 readily from the an-
swers reported. The subjects were asked to provide personal details and a range of
factual information and opinions about his or her running career. (See Appendix A.)
In drawing on these data for analysis, I used an archival procedure to yield an
“unobtrusive measure” (Webb et al. 1966) of the temporality indigenous to run-
ning. The fundamental methodological assumption turns on the researcher’s inter-
est in the runner’s point of view, in how runners plan, schedule, organize, and de-
scribe their activities. Consequently, the natural material to attend to is runners’
talk about their sport. A sample of such talk is readily available in my main sources,
magazine and newspaper articles, as well as television and radio reports, autobiog-
raphies, and the like.3 These sources provide a rich fund of relevant material for in-
terpretive analysis. Such data have the advantage of “nonreactivity,” for they are
accepted as part of the runner’s world that they describe. For some purposes, this
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material might be regarded as unrepresentative and biased. However, for qualita-
tive analysis, a different valuation can be made, as this material gives us information
about those who lie at the very center, rather than the periphery, of the running
world. Moreover, because my interest here lies in the analytic description of time-
related practices and not with the incidence or prevalence of these practices among
runners, the charge of bias in its usual form does not apply.
TIME IN CRITICAL THEORIES OF SPORT
In the extant sociological literature on sport, temporal organization gures most
prominently in commentaries emanating from critical theory. For present purposes,
“critical theory” can be used to group those writings (not necessarily all inspired by
Marx or critical theory) that detect something unnatural and perhaps pernicious in
the runner’s orientation to the stopwatch and her or his constant pursuit of records.
These theories present such temporal features as symptomatic of the shaping or de-
termination of running beliefs and practices by larger social formations. Although
the most systematic critical theories emanate from the Left (Rigauer 2000), we can
also nd kindred criticism from other ideological elds.4 For example, the conserva-
tive journalist Patrick Marnham (1980:25–26) points to the “corrupting” inuences
of digital technology. He maintains that the race has its own “natural drama” and that
the introduction of “split second timing” is quite simply a “meaningless addition.”
Marnham objects to the way records have come to be seen as the be-all and end-all
of competition, so much so that media commentary increasingly focuses on “the
mechanical event, differentiated from other such events by hundredths of a sec-
ond.” The real signicance in competition, he suggests, lies in the interplay of indi-
vidual characters. And this mechanical stance is thoroughly conducive to the pur-
poses of “totalitarianism,” a system that is unable to cope with individual difference.
In this view, the digital clock is the very enemy of spontaneity and individuality, rep-
resenting a “totalitarianism that is creeping through the Western world.”
Less charged critical views include those of the cultural theorist Fred Inglis
(1977) who sees a “grim heroism” in the strivings of the distance runner. In measur-
ing his or her efforts against the minute divisions of the stopwatch, the runner sym-
bolizes the emphasis our culture places on achievement. Accordingly, “long distance
running is the sporting triumph of the ethic of individualism” and can be regarded as
“part of the puritan spirit and its awful exaltation of the stiff, insensate will” (Inglis
1977:43). Inglis does not see temporal technology as corrosive of the human spirit;
rather he takes it to be an icon of the currently preferred shape of that spirit.
However, this assessment simply will not do as adequate analysis for Marxist ap-
proaches. In the eyes of the French Marxist Jean-Marie Brohm, sport is to be re-
garded, most generally, as “a colossal process of alienation” (1978:111), which arises
from what he sees as “a structural parallel between the capitalist mode of produc-
tion and the sporting process” (1978:69). In his theoretical statements Brohm in-
variably uses “sport” as a generic term, but clearly many of his assessments are
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shaded by his observations of track and eld athletics (note the title of his book:
Sport: A Prison of Measured Time). His basic point seems to be that activities such
as running are nothing more than idealized reections of the dominant forms of
capitalist sociality: “The driving forces in sport—performance, competitiveness,
records—are directly carried over from the driving forces of capitalism: productiv-
ity, the search for prot, rivalry and competitiveness” (1978:50).
Brohm also maintains that “sport is the institutionalized positivism of physical
progress” (1978:69; emphasis removed). Sport measures human progress through
constant improvement in records. Time is, of course, central to the measurement of
records: “time in sport is a smooth descending curve.” Human progress has been
quantied into sporting performances that can be measured by the instrument of ab-
stract time—the stopwatch. Sport thus generates its own mythology centered on a
fundamentally “childish” question: who is best? A mythology of “fabulous exploits”
is manufactured. Symbolic barriers are arbitrarily hewn from the relevant range of
performance values (four-minute miles, ten-second 100 meters, etc.), values that
then serve as markers for the periodization of sports history. The authors of these
performances also assume mythic status; they become champion-supermen/women.
All this concern with precise timing, systematic measurement, and the recognition
of records is not, Brohm maintains, an eternal and universal feature of sport; rather
it epitomizes modern competitive sport. Winning has been reied. A fetish is made
of records. Marx’s description of the modern labor process could well apply to the
modern runner: “time is everything, man is nothing; he is, at most, time’s carcase”
(cited in Brohm 1978:74).
Bero Rigauer’s (1981) work is a more precise development of Brohm’s general
critique. Rigauer explores the structural similarities of sporting activity and the
work activity of the wage laborer, whereas Brohm asserts a broad homology between
capitalism and modern sport as the touchstone of his analyses. Rigauer’s major claim
has particular relevance to the temporal aspects of running. He argues that the top-
level runner is a specialist whose record-breaking performances represent essen-
tially collective, not individual, achievements. These performances depend on col-
laborative relationships between the runner and other specialists (coaches; experts
in sports physiology and medicine; promoters; etc.). A division of labor characteris-
tic of capitalist work relations is thus evident. Interval training methods represent a
“Taylorization” of sporting activity comparable to assembly line production tech-
niques (Rigauer 1981:33–40). Just as the wage laborer’s workday is carefully planned
as a period of productive activity, so too the runner’s weeks and years are planned
in accordance with training programs that “clearly show the traces of rationalized,
goal-oriented, planned behaviour” (1981:44). For Rigauer the runner’s times ex-
press the quantitative consciousness that reduces the individual human to an ab-
stract commodity, “the 9.9-second-man” (1981:58, 71), just as the wage laborer pro-
duces commodities valued only in exchange terms (see also Peters 1976).
The critical theories outlined above suggest connections that might be forged be-
tween the present study and established varieties of social criticism. Rigauer (1981:107–
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11) rightly insists that we should not privilege sport as a form of social activity and
absolve it from critical scrutiny. The critiques also serve as reminders of how run-
ning, like any other contemporary sport, bears the imprint of aspects of the Western,
modern industrial society that sustains it: sport involves social relations not entirely
divorced from the environing society.5 I do not intend to refute the critiques out-
lined above but to indicate the partial nature of their analyses and thereby suggest
that the temporality of running consists of much more than they envision when we
understand running from the point of view of those who participate in it.
THE RHYTHMS OF THE RUNNING WORLD
The temporal organization of the running world has a fundamentally cyclical struc-
ture. Competitive events—races—lie at the heart of this temporal organization.
Races are the red-letter days on runners’ calendars, and runners direct their efforts
toward doing well in them. Although races take place year-round, particular kinds
of races typically occur at certain times of the year: in Britain the major division is
between a cross-country season, extending approximately from October through to
March, and a “track” season, occupying the intervening summer months. Little
track racing is done outdoors in winter; cross-country races are rare in the summer
months (there are, of course, exceptions to the rule). Climate obviously plays an im-
portant part in determining this division: cold, wet weather seldom promotes fast
track running, but it creates the abundance of mud essential to genuine cross-country
racing. Road racing is the one type of competition that takes place on a year-round
basis, and many runners, especially older ones, race only on roads. A seasonal pat-
tern is evident: in Britain few marathons take place in the coldest and darkest win-
ter months, while short road races (of 1 mile and 5 kilometers) are usually held in
the spring and summer, often in the light evenings.
Climate determines in broad outline the temporal scheduling of races opportuni-
ties. Its inuence is pervasive and quite fundamental. Indeed, what we seem to have
is an example, in a modern industrial society, of E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s (1939,
1940) notion of “oecological time”—a notion originally devised to describe those
cyclical concepts of time that were considered reections of the Nuer’s relations to
their environment.
However, runners differ from the Nuer of Evans-Pritchard’s day in that, along
with most other members of Western society, they orient to a “standard temporal
reference framework” (Zerubavel 1977) in which they measure the passage of time
according to the conventional units days, months, years, and so on. In addition, how-
ever, runners impose a series of calibrations of their own on this standard framework.
Many races occur at xed times of the year. For example, the English National
Cross-Country Championship is usually held on the rst Saturday in March each
year. At any point in the year, the competitive runner can situate his or her present
in terms of immediate past and future races. A temporally ordered program of
races, a program institutionalized as a “xture list,” is known in advance and func-
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tions as a kind of map for the runner, providing a relevant set of benchmarks. Mar-
vin Scott, in his book on horse racing, reports a similar practice among grooms at
racetrack stables:
Time is measured not by the calendar but by the racing season. The past is punc-
tuated by the emergence of a series of great horses, and the benchmarks of the
passing of time are referred to as “the year of Whirlaway,” “the year of Citation”
and so forth. For backstage people, everyone has the same big clock. (1968:72)
Distance runners will sometimes speak of “the year Bernie Ford won the National”
(the English Cross-Country Championships). Of course, the xture list itself is one
type of calendar, and as such it has those properties that Durkheim (1915:11)
identied long ago: “a calendar expresses the rhythm of the collective activities,
while at the same time its function is to assure their regularity” (see also Zerubavel
1981:70–100).
Most races held on a recurrent basis, championship races especially, are annual
affairs. That a particular race takes place only once a year no doubt imposes a cer-
tain urgency on the individual’s performance and serves to heighten interest in its
outcome. Many races at the international level, however, occur at longer intervals,
sometimes as long as four years. The four-yearly Olympic cycle currently constitutes
the master cycle in running, and winning an Olympic gold medal is still the supreme
accolade any runner can receive (although the introduction in 1983 of the World
Athletics Championships, now held every two years, represents a signicant chal-
lenge to the importance of the Olympics). The European Athletic Championships
are also held every four years, and comparable competitions exist on other conti-
nents (the Pan-American Games, the Pan-Africa Games, the Asian Games). We
can distinguish, then, the broad picture of an annual cycle of races up to the na-
tional level overlaid by the longer cycles of Olympic Games and World Champion-
ships at the international level.
The training of the competitive runner is organized to mesh with these cyclical
patterns. In terms of time and effort expended, training constitutes the larger part
of running activity; typically, races are the “ends” to which training is the “means.”
Training involves the cultivation of one’s athletic abilities, and it must be under-
taken systematically if the runner is to reap a satisfactory reward, whether in com-
petitive performance or personal well-being. There is much debate over the relative
merits of different methods of training; also, individual training varies a good deal.
Not surprisingly, then, a sizable proportion of each questionnaire prole is devoted
to the runner’s training. Although the responses to the questionnaires vary mark-
edly, the questions are standardized and reveal a widely taken-for-granted temporal
pattern of training (see Appendix A). From an inspection of these questions we can
conclude that for most runners the week is the basic training cycle. Training usually
takes place on a given number of days each week, and a similar type of training
tends to be performed on the same day each week (e.g., circuit training on Tuesdays,
hill running on Wednesdays, etc.). Races typically take place on weekends, and the
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longest and most time-consuming run occurs on Sundays. Given that most runners
in Britain also have jobs, the temporal organization of training into a weekly cycle
probably responds, in the rst instance, to constraints exterior to running. For the
runner in paid employment, Saturdays and Sundays allow the maximum amount of
time to devote to this leisure activity.6 Although some runners operate with longer cy-
cles for certain types of training—for example, fortnightly weight training schedules—
the week is clearly the basic unit of the training cycle.
The interview proles also yield information about standard seasonal variations
in the weekly cycle. Obviously, the type of training undertaken in a given week
must be coordinated with the type of race the runner wishes to attempt. Runners
modify training schedules according to season and also according to the anticipated
race. Track runners’ widely adopted pattern (as the questionnaire proles show)
treats early fall as a fallow period, builds up the weekly mileage to a maximum
around January or February, and then drops the mileage slightly and increases the
intensity (this involves what is sometimes known as “speed endurance training”).
Finally, as the warmer weather arrives in spring, track runners undertake some “in-
terval training,” that is, training involving short fast runs, with measured recovery
periods. Their typical pattern maximizes racing performances in the summer.
Interestingly, elite runners reproduce precise details of their training for publica-
tion. They have a sure grasp of what training they did and when they did it. As
noted above, effective training has to be systematic. This systematic approach en-
tails keeping what runners call a “training diary.” By means of this precise record,
the runner can refer accurately to training completed one or more years ago and
plan intelligently for the future. By reference to the training diary, the runner can
engage in a retrospective search for reasons for particular racing performances, ill-
nesses, injuries, and so forth.
I have described two leading features of the temporal organization of running as
the cyclical racing pattern and the planned and scheduled character of training. A
basic problem for runners is coordinating these features, that is, to have done ade-
quate training in preparation for valued races. Training for a race resembles prepar-
ing for an examination, and the racer’s anxieties in many ways parallel those of the
student. We could suggest that the likely psychological consequence of these tempo-
ral organizations produces strong “future time orientations,” that is, a well-developed
capacity to link images of the future with concepts of the past and present (Cottle
and Klineberg 1974). As a social type, the runner could be seen as the antithesis
of Finestone’s ([1957] 1964:288) “cat,” whose general orientation is fatalistic, who
eschews future planning, who lives for today, and who prizes “kicks” above all
else. We might also propose that attending to the temporal features outlined in
this section offers a sociological avenue of investigation into the phenomenon of
“running addiction.” An alternative sociological explanation counters those based
on personality (e.g., Crossman, Jamieson, and Henderson 1987; Diekhoff 1984;
Hinkle, Lyons, and Burke 1989; Morgan 1979) that have become established in
the literature.7
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MAPPING THE RUNNER’S CAREER
Elite runners judge their running biography in “career” terms—an eminently tem-
poral notion and one that forms the major focus of the interview and questionnaire
proles. How are careers conventionally described in these data? The runner’s career
typically emphasizes chosen events and outstanding performances and accomplish-
ments. Thus an athlete is usually described as a “1500 meters runner” but also as a
“3:40 performer.” A “time” displays an athletic capacity, yet, as a type of credential, it
also bestows a particular identity: it is emblematic of a self. Small wonder, then, that
runners speak of these emblems in possessive terms such as “my 2:08,” “my 13:20,”
and so on. When runners trace their best times for a given event over a period of
years, they create a table known as an “annual progression.” We can readily gain an
impression of a runner’s career simply by glancing at such tables. Accomplishments,
that is, placings in major races and championships, also serve as benchmarks in the
runner’s career (and these too are faithfully listed in the questionnaire proles).
In reading an annual progression table, we make sense of a runner’s career by
means of the “documentary method of interpretation.” Harold Garnkel (1956:194)
wrote: “The documentary method is a way of realizing the unity of a biography. The
work of historicizing past events, either for a particular person or a collectivity, con-
sists of the application of the documentary method to the task of selecting and or-
dering past occurrences.” The “past occurrences” selected and collected by the
annual progression table are the runner’s best times for an event for each year,
arranged in successive order. These times consist of the “actual appearances” as-
sumed to “point to” an “underlying pattern,” namely, the varying fortunes of a run-
ner’s career. But we can only make sense of this collection of times as an annual
progression table by means of some “presupposition” of the careerlike structure of
participation in running. However, the annual progression table is schematic and
designed as no more than a rough index of a runner’s career. Sometimes it will be
revealing, sometimes misleading. Obviously, we can appraise a year’s races in other
terms than best performance—for example, individuals beaten, consistency of per-
formance, placings in signicant races—and these criteria gure in certain of the
more sophisticated ranking lists assembled for the major championship distances.
The notion of career is indigenous to the culture of competitive running (and
doubtless more generally to Western sports). However, instead of regarding the
concept as a simple extension of the language and logic of capitalist labor to an os-
tensibly playful sphere (as do critical theorists), it seems more cogent to approach
running careers from the point of view of George Herbert Mead’s (1932) theory of
time. For Mead the past is not a simple accumulation and sedimentation of presents.
Social actors always select their pasts from the vantage of a present (Mead 1932:7–
9, 16–18). The questionnaire proles accentuate this temporal process, objectifying
the runner’s responses made in a present through their publication in a specialist
magazine. The process of selecting a past can be seen, above all, in the question
“When did you rst realize you could reach international level?” which requests the
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respondent to answer in terms of a discrete “turning point” (Hughes 1958; Strauss
[1959] 1977). Runners commonly reply to this question by identifying a critical race
that they see in retrospect as a “testing point” (Roth 1963:84). Testing points have a
make or break character; they are critical turning points in determining the career
direction a runner will take. One runner who realized that she could reach interna-
tional level gave a typical reply: “In 1973 when beating Joan Allison and Margaret
Coomber in the Kent County 800 championship in a personal best of 2:09.5—an im-
provement of six seconds” (Athletics Weekly, May 8, 1976). For some runners, such
realizations come suddenly and unexpectedly. In one classic case, a hitherto undis-
tinguished runner had the revelation that he could reach the international standard
“at about 3:00 p.m. of October 27th, 1973” (Athletics Weekly, May 30, 1980), shortly
before completing and winning the very rst marathon he attempted (he went on to
win the Commonwealth and European titles the next year).
Careers in running can begin at about the age of ten or eleven. A wide range of
age-graded competitions are available to ten- to twenty-year-old athletes. Between
twenty and forty the athlete has “senior” status; runners deem this period the most
propitious for performance. Career lines need not end at forty; a great expansion in
“Veterans” (“Masters” in the United States) running has occurred in recent years,
which is age graded in ve-year bands. Thus organized running provides for the
commencement of a career line at almost any age. This fact has led one ethnogra-
pher to argue that the critical differences between runners should be identied not
in age terms but in terms of “moral career”: changes in diet, physical appearance,
outlook, shoes and kit worn that are seen to herald and index changes in self-
conception (Nash 1976).
As in all careers, runners have ups and downs; some have Indian summers. All
runners must accommodate the nitude of their sporting careers, just as we must
all face the nitude of our lives. Participation in sport, perhaps more than participa-
tion in many other activities, forcefully reminds us of these natural limitations.
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann put it this way:
My own life is an episode in standard time. This time was here before me and
will go on after me. The knowledge of my inevitable death makes this time nite
for me. I have only a certain amount of time available for the realization of my
projects, and the knowledge of this affects my attitude to these projects. Also,
since I do not want to die, this knowledge injects an underlying anxiety into my
projects. Thus I cannot endlessly repeat my participation in sports events. I know I
am getting older. It may even be that this is the last occasion on which I have the
chance to participate. (1966:41, emphasis added; see also Schutz and Luckmann,
1974:47–48)
Runners evince more mundane versions of these ideas in their reasoning. An inter-
national middle-distance runner was once reported as saying, “I’ll race anyone, be-
cause you never know—you may not be running in a couple of weeks’ time” (The
Guardian, July 19, 1977), echoing the frequently expressed opinion that every well-
known runner is just one injury or illness away from obscurity.
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A GRAMMAR OF “TIMES”
As should now be apparent, runners and all those who take a close interest in run-
ning have an abiding concern with “times.” Times confer a particular and precise
identity on a runner. Thus in the specialist press one often reads headlines such as
“Boit 2’15”13, Ovett 7’41”3 (L’Equipe, September 26, 1977); “Tatyana Kazankina—
3:52.5!” (Athletic Weekly, August 23, 1980). Times can work as a method for render-
ing running performances accountable, that is, objective, describable, and recogniz-
able for what they are. To say “I ran a two-mile race only a few weeks ago in 9:35”
(Athletics Weekly, May 19, 1980) makes a description of a particular athletic perfor-
mance publicly available. The “time” measures an instance of running as a xed du-
ration, as abstract and objectively identical units of time. How, then, is it possible to
speak (as runners do) of “fast times” and “slow times”? After all, any runner cannot
move faster or slower than another in the ow of time, when we have only one uni-
form measure of time. The philosopher John Wild formulates the problem in the
following way:
One runner in a race may arrive at the spatial end point sooner than another at
2:05. But he cannot reach the instant 2:05 sooner than another. If this were pos-
sible, sooner than would lose all meaning, for there would be no constant mea-
sure. (1954:543)
Any analysis of “times” must address what William J. Morgan (1978:145) has called
“the ineluctable spatialization of time.” In the rst instance, “times” are always rel-
ative to the distance covered and to the mode of traversing that distance (whether it
be running, race walking, hurdling, steeplechasing). This feature of “times” alerts us
to a characteristic of running diametrically opposed to the form of life immortalized
by Rudyard Kipling (quoted in Opie and Opie 1973:324) in his poem, “If”: “If you
can ll the unforgiving minute/With sixty seconds’ worth of distance run.”
What matters in most cases is the time taken to cover a specied distance, not the
distance covered in a xed time. Some relatively uncommon exceptions to this gen-
eralization are evident, such as one hour and twenty-four-hour races in which the
aim is to cover the maximum possible distance in those time periods, but by and
large the time-distance ratio predominates in making a runner’s performance
accountable.
I have argued that “times” make performances in running races accountable. We
can state this observation as an interpretive rule for runners: If it is possible to de-
scribe a performance in terms of a “time,” then so describe it. I next explore some
of the conditions and associated forms of reasoning in which such a rule has dimin-
ished signicance or no real relevance at all for runners. It is plainly the case that
running performances are also accountable in terms other than those of “times.”
A condition for the adequacy of times as measures of performance is that the
race actually is its stated distance. In track racing distances are readily calculable
because outdoor tracks have standard dimensions: they are 400 meters long, the
straights have a specied length, and the bends have a determinate curve (indoor
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tracks tend to be rather less standardized). This standardization enables unequivo-
cal comparisons to be made, say, between a 5,000-meter performance on a track in
Prague with a 5,000-meter run on a track in Dublin. Races up to 400 meters are run
entirely in lanes to eliminate the possibility of fast-moving competitors colliding
with one another. This practice, however, introduces a source of variability in that
runners in the outer lanes in races that involve running at least one bend cannot see
their fellow competitors for part of the race. These runners have been placed far-
ther forward in space than competitors on the inner lanes (this practice ensures that
everyone runs exactly the same distance). Thus the true situation in the race be-
comes apparent only “when the stagger unwinds.” For this reason many runners
prefer to run the inner lanes because it reduces the period in which they cannot see
the other competitors. In televised sports, commentators are usually quick to note
the disadvantage faced by the runner in the outside lane and runners themselves ex-
press sentiments such as feeling “choked” (Athletics Weekly, January 22, 1977).
This same logic also dominates in the longer events that do not have lanes. The
most favorable position is that closest to the curb where the distance for one circuit
of the track is exactly 400 meters. The curvature of the track forces some runners to
“run wide” in the second and third lanes. They end up running farther than those
closer to the inside, which can lead athletes to revise their judgment of a time. For
example: “I went through the rst lap in 50 and bits. I probably lost seven or eight
meters (through being pushed into an outer lane), so it was probably worth 49”
(Athletics Weekly, January 22, 1977). This athlete reasons that “50 and bits” for ap-
proximately 408 meters translates into “49” seconds for 400 meters.
Distance races, of course, take place on surfaces other than the track: cross-country
running and especially road racing are immensely popular in Britain. Runners pay
less attention to times on such surfaces, in large part because they present variable
racing conditions: some courses are hilly, others at; some courses present obstacles
(streams, fences), others do not; some courses consist of “laps,” others are of the
“out and back” variety. All these conditions can affect a runner’s time, and they can
affect some runners more than others. Thus a leading track athlete tells us, “I am
not a very good cross-country runner . . . [I]f it [the course] is at I can run on it, but
if it is mud and hills then I just don’t want to know” (Athletics Weekly, December 24,
1979).
Road and country times assume lesser signicance because of the enormous va-
riety of courses, as the general absence of split-second timing indicates. Runners,
however, keep “course records” that stand as benchmarks against which they can
judge race times. Therefore, runners regard cross-country racing differently than
other types of races. Placing in the eld assumes more importance than the time. In-
deed, British runners sometimes voice complaints when courses do not seem to
meet the standard features of cross-country—ditches, plowed elds, and mud.
Many cross-country races in continental Europe are held on the smoother surfaces
of race courses, but British runners sometimes feel that these surfaces are too
closely akin to track racing. They often judge road courses a little differently.
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Although their length is usually carefully calculated with a measuring wheel, run-
ners are prone to question the veracity of the stated length of the course. The re-
mark of a former world record holder for the marathon is typical:
Well, that 2:09:36—I never knew I could run that fast. Matter of fact, that was
one instance where I thought there was something wrong with the course or tim-
ing. . . . I couldn’t believe it when they said 2:09:36. I thought, hell, 2:19:36 it
should be. I thought maybe they left the “one” off. (Athletics Weekly, April 19,
1980)8
Similar reasoning is common when competitors clock a series of “fast” times. In
these cases it is believed that the course is short. The usual argument is, We know
what times athletes X, Y, and Z are routinely capable of for the distance, yet in this
race isn’t it odd that X, Y, and Z are running a good deal faster? The course “must
be” short. A fast time for a road course but especially a series of fast times can give
rise to doubt about their “authenticity.”
Unfavorable or excessively favorable climatic conditions—for example, when
the temperature, humidity, or atmospheric pressure falls outside the “normal”
range, or when there is excessive wind of rain—can also serve as grounds for ques-
tioning the adequacy of times as performance descriptors. A runner who set a Brit-
ish record for the mile on a cold Norwegian evening gave some idea of what
“normal” weather conditions mean. This runner was reported as saying, “I never
thought I’d see my own breath during a track race in summer” (Athletics Weekly,
November 2, 1977). A race report provides another example: “The freak warm
weather that sent the barometer [sic] up to 708F made times relatively slow through-
out, with several class men unable to break 50 minutes” (Athletics Weekly, May 3,
1980).
Under international rules, times recorded for the short sprints and hurdle races
that show evidence of a following wind in excess of two meters per second must
bear the sufx w, thus 10.12w. Although there is not yet formal control of times
under certain atmospheric pressures, informally runners distinguish between times
recorded near sea-level altitudes and those recorded “at altitude” (usually 5,000 to
10,000 feet above sea level). It is no coincidence that world records for men’s short
sprints and long jumps have been set at altitudes where air resistance is lower. Alti-
tude has a detrimental effect on distance performances.
Ranges of ways in which times, on their own, are unsatisfactory descriptors of
performance have been examined. However, I do not suggest that in such circum-
stances times are “poor” or “inadequate” or “unreliable” descriptors per se. Rather,
what I have outlined includes some of the common factors that runners may em-
ploy in conjunction with times to appraise a performance. I also want to draw atten-
tion to the different ways of attending to times according to their use. Let us look
again at the weather example: “The freak warm weather that sent the barometer up
to 708F made times relatively slow throughout, with several class men unable to
break 50 minutes.” Here a race report reexively ties “times” to “weather condi-
tions,” such that the evaluation of each requires an assessment of the other. (Why
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were the times so slow? Look at the weather. How bad was the weather? Just look
at the times.)
An interest in how runners attend to times according to their use leads us into an
area of explanations, excuses, and justications occupied by the sociology of moti-
vation (e.g., Goffman 1971; Lyman and Scott 1968; Mills 1940; Nash 1980). More
work might be done on these materials from this perspective; here I want to con-
sider a few illustrations to suggest certain possibilities.
A strict time-based judgment of a runner’s performance will sometimes be un-
dercut by citing such extenuating circumstances as recovery from illness and injury,
lack of effort, or evidence of “proper” preparation. When a road course record for-
merly held by Brendan Foster was broken, a colleague of his defensively pointed
out, “Bren’s record’s not much anyway—he did it off 130 miles that week” (Athletics
Weekly, May 3, 1980). This statement asks us to believe that Foster’s old record was
not as good as it might have been because before the race Foster was tired from
running a very high training mileage (and as a corollary, if Foster had then prepared
for that race seriously, the record would have been more difcult to break than it
actually was). A runner can enhance the impression a time makes by invoking ill-
ness or injury, as when Rod Dixon tells us, “I was not 100% t but I still went and
ran 3:33.9” (Athletics Weekly, July 24, 1976). The assumption that the runner’s time
represented a maximum effort on his or her part can also be challenged, and a run-
ner can draw on lack of effort as a resource to bring about a revaluation of time.
Thus the same runner tells us:
I did a half-effort time trial on June 14th. I went for an hour’s run in the morn-
ing, warmed up for about 30 minutes, went down to the track and started doing
66s. I ended up doing 13:54—half effort. (He ran 13:17.4 for 3rd in Stockholm on
July 5th—Ed.). (Athletics Weekly, July 24, 1976)
Here both runner and editor collaborate to persuade us that we should not take the
time, 13:54, as a true measure of Dixon’s form. First we are told (twice) that it is a
“half-effort” run. Then we learn that Dixon had run that day for one and a half
hours before the time trial, so we may reasonably believe that he was at least a little
tired. Next Dixon gives a casual impression about the whole thing (“I just went
down to the track and started doing 66s”), and nally the editor tells us that less
than three weeks later he ran a very fast time in a race, which provides conrma-
tion, if conrmation were needed, that on June 14 it was indeed a “half-effort” run.
A note on the phenomenon of “splits” is essential to any consideration of the
pragmatics of times. Splits are times taken for unit distances less than the whole dis-
tance being raced (“doing 66s” in the previous example). “Lap times” are the most
common kind of split. They refer to the time taken for one lap, but splits can vary in
length. The leader’s splits for each mile or 5-kilometers stretch of marathon races
are sometimes published, and splits for each 100 meters of major 1,500-meter world
record races are becoming commonplace. Splits are objective indicators of the pace
of a race. Before a race many runners will have knowledge of the splits that they
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will be aiming for. During a race, should they encounter actual splits that vary
signicantly from those projected, they may become disconsolate or fearful. Some-
times runners involved in very fast races do not wish to hear the splits, because “ig-
norance is bliss.”
Just how crucial splits may be can be seen when a runner hears a split that is at
variance with expectation. A common response is to nd fault with either the time-
piece or the timekeeping. A watch may not be believed to be working properly, or a
timekeeper may be thought to have misread it:
I approached the group of waiting spectators, ofcials and timekeepers, striding
well, listening for the lap time. “23:16.” “23:16,” I thought to myself, Christ,
they’re way out! I shouted back, “Christ Almighty, can’t you read the bloody
watch?” I was annoyed; I wanted to do a fast time, but I needed information that
was accurate so that I could gauge my efforts. . . . Up to the slight incline to the
markers at two laps I was keen to hear the proper time. “46:51.” Christ they were
right. This was really moving. I had two choices: slow down in case I blew up
later, or keep it going. (Hill 1981:376)
Sometimes the fault is genuine. A distinguished eld of middle distance runners
was once defeated by its own “hare” (pacemaker). Afterward, several competitors
explained that they had allowed the hare to build up such a big lead because the
timekeeper had been calling out “fast” splits, which they thought were their own
but which turned out to be the splits of the hare running some distance ahead of
them. As a result of receiving this misinformation, their judgment of the pace was
adversely affected.
Splits can serve yet another purpose for the evaluation of a time. Two identical
times by different runners can be compared by analyzing their splits. The perfor-
mance that diverges most widely from “even-paced” running is usually adjudged
the most difcult to achieve. In marathon running at all levels, a premium is placed
on the achievement of a “negative split,” a second half of the race that is run faster
than the rst half. Thus these quantitative measures are not only of great interest to
the statisticians of running performances. They enable runners themselves to make
ne distinctions about the qualitative aspects of a particular time.
The ethnographic analysis of times may be regarded as empirically illustrating
aspects of Mead’s (1932) theory of temporality. In this analytic frame a “time” for a
running performance is an emergent event, existing in a present and thus displaying
the property of sociality, or “the capacity of being several things at once” (Mead
1932:49). The runner’s physiological capabilities, resolve, tactical sense, and other
personal qualities clearly dene the performance, but it is not determined or foreor-
dained by these qualities alone. Several environmental factors also inhibit or facilitate
a runner’s performance (terrain, weather, etc.). Thus a time, an apparently objective
measure of performance, turns out to be an estimation shaped by the environment
as well as the runner’s athletic capacities. The accomplishment that the time repre-
sents is also social in Mead’s sense, because it is determined by the runner’s past
training yet marks out a new vista of future performances that the accomplished
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time potentiates. For example, a runner completing a half marathon in eighty min-
utes will have condence that appropriate training and preparation makes a mara-
thon of under three hours within reach. In this respect, the present comes to have a
malleable structure arising from the emergent character of a particular time.
In the preceding ethnographic analysis, I have emphasized two broad features of
times. First, times can function as identity symbols, advertising a running capability
and placing the runner in a clear location in the hierarchies of the running world as
well as providing satisfactions felt appropriate to the accomplishment the time repre-
sents. Second, although a time is ostensibly an objective measure of duration, run-
ners themselves subject it to close interpretive scrutiny, seeking to establish what
it “really” means, what it is really “worth.”
CONCLUSION
In these concluding remarks I want to consider my ethnographic analysis of running
temporality in light of the critical theories with which I began.9 What implications
does the ethnographic analysis hold for these critical approaches? And what might
be the implications of such critical theories for the ethnographic analysis presented
here?
It is easier to formulate a response to the rst question than the second. Answers
to both take us through some familiar argumentative terrain. Throughout this arti-
cle I aimed to develop an ethnographic approach to the temporal patterning and
symbolism of running informed by symbolic interactionism. The ethnographic di-
mension of my approach may be minimally dened by two ideas popularized by
Clifford Geertz (1973, [1974] 1983): it seeks to develop a “thick description” of “the
native’s point of view.” None of the critical theories reviewed earlier consider the run-
ner’s point of view as an important focus of analysis. This tendency is perhaps wide-
spread in the sociology of sport (Kew 1986; Leonard and Schmitt 1987). Of course,
it would be easy to place critical and ethnographic approaches in different boxes,
acknowledging in the manner of Habermas (1972) that differing cognitive interests
of emancipation and understanding animate them. However, if critical theories are
allowed to breach this resolution for peaceful coexistence, they can readily miscon-
strue or caricature their chosen targets, ignoring or downgrading the rationalities of
participants.10
From an interactionist, ethnographic perspective, critical theories present only
partial, “thin” descriptions of the temporal aspects of running; the analyses they
present rest on a questionable database. These theories trade on idealized, perhaps
stereotypical conceptions of involvement in sport rather than treat the ethno-
graphic description of the beliefs and practices that comprise involvement in sport
as the essential basis of any thorough sociological analysis. In consequence, they
neglect central concerns that this article has sought to document: the motivated
character of training schedules, what sporting careers actually mean to participants
(including the grounds for the appraisal of these careers), and how runners orient
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to and reason about “times” and “splits” as performance descriptors. My analysis
suggests some of the deciencies of theories based on thin ethnographic description
and indicates an alternative approach that treats seriously the meanings of run-
ning to those who participate. Although a symbolic interactionist analysis of ethno-
graphic and qualitative data cannot refute critical arguments, they can show what is
lacking.
The tougher question concerns how critical theory might inform ethnographic
analyses. Certainly runners sometimes experience training as onerous “work.” They
may adopt a systematic and calculative approach to planning, if not their entire run-
ning careers, at least what they hope to do over the next few months. They may be-
come obsessed with times as measures of performances and performers. In these
ways, running may on occasion resemble—and be experienced as—oppressive and
exploitative work, racing against time that is always running away with us. (More
often, however, runners’ friends and intimates comment on their excessive absorp-
tion in the sport: acting like a cultural dope soon draws attention.)
As noted, critical theory’s emancipatory impulse can serve as a reminder of al-
ternative conceptions of running untainted by the temporal constraints characteris-
tic of labor discipline in industrial capitalism. Whether runners need such a re-
minder remains open to question, because the critical impulse is not the sole
prerogative of critical theory. It seems unlikely that runners unreectively appropri-
ate temporal forms, ideologies, and technologies from industrial capitalism. Run-
ners themselves understand that it is important to run without wearing a watch and
to just run according to how you feel, or that constantly monitoring times can be
counterproductive.11 They understand that temporal organization can enable and
constrain runners. It enables them by providing an accurate and reliable gauge of
running performance, when interpreted appropriately. In addition, it permits them
to schedule training that will make a race more comfortable to complete. It con-
strains them through imposing training schedules to follow and stopwatches that
measure performance without negotiation. Runners recognize this temporal orga-
nization. It is part of the runner’s self. That self is in part constituted by the kinds of
temporal considerations outlined above. The cyclical racing pattern, the planned and
scheduled character of training, the temporal dimensions of running careers, the vul-
nerabilities of times as performance descriptors—all provide a shared vocabulary and
situated symbolism that runners know and appreciate in detail. This article has
sought to examine some aspects of the temporal considerations that runners use
that contribute to and reafrm the runner’s self. Rather than time oppressing and
exploiting runners, runners exploit it as a constructive resource that they can deploy
in diverse ways.
Acknowledgments: Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Interna-
tional Conference on the Future of Adult Life in Leeuwenhorst, the Netherlands, in
July 1990 and in seminars at the Universities of Salford and Manchester, U.K. I am
Racing against Time? 359
pleased to record my thanks to three anonymous reviewers for Symbolic Interaction
and to Garry Crawford, Art Frank, Chris Loxley, Lee Monaghan, Ian Taylor, Rod
Watson, and Doug Webster for their constructive comments. Thanks are especially
due to Andrew Travers, who helped with both early and late versions of this article.
NOTES
1. I use the term “runners” to draw attention to the temporal practices of those who engage in
distance running, though many of my observations apply to kindred athletic practices: sprint-
ing, hurdling, steeplechasing, road running, cross-country, and race walking.
2. The standard format of the questionnaire proles featured questions applied to nearly all respon-
dents in the same order (see Appendix A). My use of the information is clearly guided by my so-
ciologically oriented perceptions. The reality I have imposed on those answers is shaped by my
focus on runners’ temporal conceptions.
3. See Donnelly (1985:568), who makes a similar recommendation of the value of these sources
for the study of sport subcultures.
4. In America, Baudrillard (1988) offers a famed and eloquent postmodern critique of running.
Runners cannot be stopped, for their compulsive activity denotes a “mind riveted on the inner
countdown to the moment when . . . a higher plane of consciousness” is achieved (1988:37).
But his claim that runners cannot be stopped because their minds are allegedly “riveted” on
the achievement of “a higher plane of consciousness” overlooks both the general relevance in
public places of the norm of civil inattention (Goffman 1963:83–88) and its temporary and
conditional suspension in the case of runners exercising in public (Smith 1997:73, 76). Baudril-
lard’s thin descriptions of that which he seeks to critique looks, from an interactionist point of
view, to be little more than sarcasm posing as analysis. His description stands in contrast to the
interactionist use of ironic tropes grounded in the close study of the worlds they describe (e.g.,
Goffman 1961; Hughes 1958).
5. Yet all too often these theories trade on an unreective view of the relationship of macrosocial
to microsocial processes, assuming that in the latter we can nd simple reproductions or mir-
rors of the former. For an alternate view, see Goffman 1983.
6. Full-time runners, that is, those whose main source of income derives from the activity, are in a
position to operate more exibly in scheduling their long runs, because the temporal demands
of paid employment do not affect them.
7. Some “committed” runners, for example, will run through injury or illness to “stick to” their
chosen schedule, even if it entails risking longer-term damage to their health in the process.
More “prudent” runners will build “slack” into their schedules, revise their goals, or seek al-
ternatives. A sociological approach to running addiction might attend to such phenomena.
8. This response raises interesting questions about variations in how runners perceive time (Fla-
herty 1999) that interview methods might elicit in the immediate postrace or postrun situation.
9. A Weberian analysis may present a more parsimonious account than neo-Marxist and allied
critical approaches to modern sport (see Guttmann 1978, 1981). In this view the pursuit of
records, split-second timing, the drive toward quantication, and so on, in running is less a
feature of capitalism than it is part and parcel of larger processes of rationalization charac-
teristic of modernity as such. Moreover, the debates about the commodication of modern
sport and its emancipatory potential clearly are far from settled (see, e.g., Digel 1988; Sewart
1987).
10. See Monaghan 2001 for an excellent examination of this tendency in sociological accounts of
bodybuilding.
11. During an interview, a forty-year-old runner stated, “Because I am running slower now than at
my peak, I’ve tended to stop looking at the stopwatches, because, although I feel fast, the
times are depressing” (Runner’s World, February 2002).













Which town do you live in?
What hobbies and interests do you have outside athletics?
Who coaches you?
When and how did you become involved in athletics?
Which athletes do you admire?
What is your favorite event?
What are your personal bests?
When did you rst realize that you could reach international level?
Where did you gure in major championships?
What is your annual progression for your main event(s)?
What has been your most pleasing performance?
What has been your greatest disappointment?
What is your target for next season?
What is your all-time goal?
What will you do after you retire from serious athletics?
What do you most like about athletics?
What do you most dislike about athletics?
What advice would you give to a youngster taking up athletics?
How often do you train?
For how long?
Where?
Is coaching important to you?
What kinds of training do you most like and dislike?
What training cycle do you follow?
Do you have a sample of a typical week’s training in winter and in summer?
Do you rest before big competitions?
Will you make any changes to the pattern of your training in the future?
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